[2026] Easy To Download CNSP Actual Exam Dumps Resources
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The SecOps Group CNSP Exam Syllabus Topics:
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NEW QUESTION # 19
Which of the following is true for SNMP?
A) The default community string for read-only access is "public."
B) The default community string for read/write access is "private."
- A. None of the above
- B. Only A
- C. Both A and B
- D. Only B
Answer: C
Explanation:
SNMP community strings authenticate access, with defaults posing security risks if unchanged.
Why C is correct:
A: "public" is the standard read-only default, per SNMP specs and CNSP.
B: "private" is the standard read-write default, also per SNMP and CNSP.
Both are true, making C the answer.
Why other options are incorrect:
1, 2: Exclude one true statement each.
4: Both statements are true, so "none" is wrong.
NEW QUESTION # 20
The Management Information Base (MIB) is a collection of object groups that is managed by which service?
- A. SMTP
- B. SNMP
- C. TACACS
- D. NTP
Answer: B
Explanation:
The Management Information Base (MIB) is a structured database defining manageable objects (e.g., CPU usage, interface status) in a network device. It's part of the SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) framework, per RFC 1157, used for monitoring and managing network devices (e.g., routers, switches).
SNMP Mechanics:
MIB Structure: Hierarchical, with Object Identifiers (OIDs) like 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (sysDescr).
Ports: UDP 161 (agent), 162 (traps).
Operation: Agents expose MIB data; managers (e.g., Nagios) query it via GET/SET commands.
MIB files (e.g., IF-MIB, HOST-RESOURCES-MIB) are vendor-specific or standardized, parsed by SNMP tools (e.g., snmpwalk). CNSP likely covers SNMP for network monitoring and securing it against enumeration (e.g., weak community strings like "public").
Why other options are incorrect:
A . SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol): Email delivery (TCP 25), unrelated to MIB or device management.
C . NTP (Network Time Protocol): Time synchronization (UDP 123), not MIB-related.
D . TACACS (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System): Authentication/authorization (TCP 49), not MIB management.
Real-World Context: SNMP misconfiguration led to the 2018 Cisco switch exploits via exposed MIB data.
NEW QUESTION # 21
Which is the correct command to change the MAC address for an Ethernet adapter in a Unix-based system?
- A. ifconfig eth0 hwr ether AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
- B. ifconfig eth0 hdw ether AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
- C. ifconfig eth0 hw ether AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
- D. ifconfig eth0 hdwr ether AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
Answer: C
Explanation:
In Unix-based systems (e.g., Linux), the ifconfig command is historically used to configure network interfaces, including changing the Media Access Control (MAC) address of an Ethernet adapter. The correct syntax to set a new MAC address for an interface like eth0 is ifconfig eth0 hw ether AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF, where hw specifies the hardware address type (ether for Ethernet), followed by the new MAC address in colon-separated hexadecimal format.
Why A is correct: The hw ether argument is the standard and correct syntax recognized by ifconfig to modify the MAC address. This command temporarily changes the MAC address until the system reboots or the interface is reset, assuming the user has sufficient privileges (e.g., root). CNSP documentation on network configuration and spoofing techniques validates this syntax for testing network security controls.
Why other options are incorrect:
B: hdw is not a valid argument; it's a typographical error and unrecognized by ifconfig.
C: hdwr is similarly invalid; no such shorthand exists in the command structure.
D: hwr is incorrect; the full keyword hw followed by ether is required for proper parsing.
NEW QUESTION # 22
What will be the subnet mask for 192.168.0.1/18?
- A. 255.225.225.0
- B. 255.255.255.0
- C. 255.225.192.0
- D. 255.255.192.0
Answer: D
Explanation:
An IP address with a /18 prefix (CIDR notation) indicates 18 network bits in the subnet mask, leaving 14 host bits (32 total bits - 18). For IPv4 (e.g., 192.168.0.1):
Binary Mask: First 18 bits are 1s, rest 0s.
1st octet: 11111111 (255)
2nd octet: 11111111 (255)
3rd octet: 11000000 (192)
4th octet: 00000000 (0)
Decimal: 255.255.192.0
Calculation:
Bits: /18 = 2^14 hosts (16,384), minus 2 (network/broadcast) = 16,382 usable.
Range: 192.168.0.0-192.168.63.255 (3rd octet: 0-63, as 192 = 11000000 covers 6 bits).
Technical Details:
Subnet masks align on octet boundaries or mid-octet (e.g., 192 = 2^7 + 2^6).
Contrast: /24 = 255.255.255.0 (256 hosts), /16 = 255.255.0.0 (65,536 hosts).
Security Implications: Larger subnets (e.g., /18) increase broadcast domains, risking amplification attacks. CNSP likely teaches subnetting for segmentation (e.g., VLANs).
Why other options are incorrect:
A . 255.255.255.0: /24 (8 host bits), not /18.
B . 255.225.225.0: Invalid mask (225 = 11100001, non-contiguous 1s).
D . 255.225.192.0: Invalid (225 breaks binary sequence).
Real-World Context: Subnetting 192.168.0.0/18 isolates departments in enterprise networks.
NEW QUESTION # 23
An 'EICAR' file can be used to?
- A. Test the response of an antivirus program
- B. Test the encryption algorithms
Answer: A
Explanation:
The EICAR test file is a standardized tool in security testing, designed for a specific purpose.
Why A is correct: The EICAR file (a 68-byte string) triggers antivirus detection without harm, testing response capabilities. CNSP recommends it for AV validation.
Why B is incorrect: It has no role in testing encryption; it's solely for AV functionality.
NEW QUESTION # 24
Which SMB (Server Message Block) network protocol versions are vulnerable to the EternalBlue (MS17-010) Windows exploit?
- A. SMBv2 only
- B. SMBv3 only
- C. Both SMBv1 and SMBv2
- D. SMBv1 only
Answer: D
Explanation:
EternalBlue (MS17-010) is an exploit targeting a buffer overflow in Microsoft's SMB (Server Message Block) implementation, leaked by the Shadow Brokers in 2017. SMB enables file/printer sharing:
SMBv1 (1980s): Legacy, used in Windows NT/XP.
SMBv2 (2006, Vista): Enhanced performance/security.
SMBv3 (2012, Windows 8): Adds encryption, multichannel.
Vulnerability:
EternalBlue exploits a flaw in SMBv1's SRVNET driver (srv.sys), allowing remote code execution via crafted packets. Microsoft patched it in March 2017 (MS17-010).
Affected OS: Windows XP to Server 2016 (pre-patch), if SMBv1 enabled.
Proof: WannaCry/NotPetya used it, targeting port 445/TCP.
SMBv1 Only: The bug resides in SMBv1's packet handling (e.g., TRANS2 requests). SMBv2/v3 rewrote this code, immune to the specific overflow.
Microsoft: Post-patch, SMBv1 is disabled by default (Windows 10 1709+).
Security Implications: CNSP likely stresses disabling SMBv1 (e.g., via Group Policy) and patching, as EternalBlue remains a threat in legacy environments.
Why other options are incorrect:
B, C: SMBv2/v3 aren't vulnerable; the flaw is SMBv1-specific.
D: SMBv2 isn't affected, only SMBv1.
Real-World Context: WannaCry's 2017 rampage hit unpatched SMBv1 systems (e.g., NHS), costing billions.
NEW QUESTION # 25
Which of the following protocols is not vulnerable to address spoofing attacks if implemented correctly?
- A. IP
- B. UDP
- C. ARP
- D. TCP
Answer: D
Explanation:
Address spoofing fakes a source address (e.g., IP, MAC) to impersonate or amplify attacks. Analyzing protocol resilience:
C . TCP (Transmission Control Protocol):
Mechanism: Three-way handshake (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) verifies both endpoints.
Client SYN (Seq=X), Server SYN-ACK (Seq=Y, Ack=X+1), Client ACK (Ack=Y+1).
Spoofing Resistance: Spoofer must predict the server's sequence number (randomized in modern stacks) and receive SYN-ACK, impractical without session hijacking or MITM.
Correct Implementation: RFC 793-compliant, with anti-spoofing (e.g., Linux tcp_syncookies).
A . UDP:
Connectionless (RFC 768), no handshake. Spoofed packets (e.g., source IP 1.2.3.4) are accepted if port is open, enabling reflection attacks (e.g., DNS amplification).
B . ARP (Address Resolution Protocol):
No authentication (RFC 826). Spoofed ARP replies (e.g., fake MAC for gateway IP) poison caches, enabling MITM (e.g., arpspoof).
D . IP:
No inherent validation at Layer 3 (RFC 791). Spoofed source IPs pass unless filtered (e.g., ingress filtering, RFC 2827).
Security Implications: TCP's handshake makes spoofing harder, though not impossible (e.g., blind spoofing with sequence prediction, mitigated since BSD 4.4). CNSP likely contrasts this with UDP/IP's vulnerabilities in DDoS contexts.
Why other options are incorrect:
A, B, D: Lack handshake or authentication, inherently spoofable.
Real-World Context: TCP spoofing was viable pre-1990s (e.g., Mitnick attack); modern randomization thwarts it.
NEW QUESTION # 26
In the context of a Unix-based system, where does a daemon process execute in the memory?
- A. User space
- B. Kernel space
Answer: A
Explanation:
In Unix-based systems, memory is divided into two primary regions: kernel space and user space, each serving distinct purposes for process execution and system stability.
Why B is correct: Daemon processes are background services (e.g., sshd, cron) that run with elevated privileges but operate in user space. User space is the memory area allocated for user applications and processes, isolated from kernel space to prevent direct hardware access or system crashes. CNSP highlights that daemons run in user space to maintain system integrity, interacting with the kernel via system calls.
Why other option is incorrect:
A . Kernel space: Kernel space is reserved for the operating system kernel and device drivers, which have unrestricted access to hardware. Running daemons in kernel space would pose significant security and stability risks, and it is not the standard practice in Unix systems.
NEW QUESTION # 27
What is the response from a closed UDP port which is not behind a firewall?
- A. None of the above
- B. A RST packet
- C. No response
- D. ICMP message showing Destination Unreachable
Answer: D
Explanation:
UDP is a connectionless protocol, and its behavior when a packet reaches a port depends on whether the port is open or closed. Without a firewall altering the response, the standard protocol applies.
Why A is correct: When a UDP packet is sent to a closed port, the host typically responds with an ICMP Type 3 (Destination Unreachable), Code 3 (Port Unreachable) message, indicating no service is listening. CNSP notes this as a key indicator in port scanning.
Why other options are incorrect:
B: RST packets are TCP-specific, not used in UDP.
C: No response occurs for open UDP ports unless an application replies, not closed ports.
D: A is correct, so "none of the above" is invalid.
NEW QUESTION # 28
What user account is required to create a Golden Ticket in Active Directory?
- A. Domain User account
- B. KRBTGT account
- C. Local User account
- D. Service account
Answer: B
Explanation:
A Golden Ticket is a forged Kerberos Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) in Active Directory (AD), granting an attacker unrestricted access to domain resources by impersonating any user (e.g., with Domain Admin privileges). Kerberos, per RFC 4120, relies on the KRBTGT account-a built-in service account on every domain controller-to encrypt and sign TGTs. To forge a Golden Ticket, an attacker needs:
The KRBTGT password hash (NTLM or Kerberos key), typically extracted from a domain controller's memory using tools like Mimikatz.
Additional domain details (e.g., SID, domain name).
Process:
Compromise a domain controller (e.g., via privilege escalation).
Extract the KRBTGT hash (e.g., lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt).
Forge a TGT with arbitrary privileges using the hash (e.g., Mimikatz's kerberos::golden command).
The KRBTGT account itself isn't "used" to create the ticket; its hash is the key ingredient. Unlike legitimate TGTs issued by the KDC, a Golden Ticket bypasses authentication checks, persisting until the KRBTGT password is reset (a rare event in most environments). CNSP likely highlights this as a high-severity AD attack vector.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . Local User account: Local accounts are machine-specific, lack domain privileges, and can't access the KRBTGT hash stored on domain controllers.
B . Domain User account: A standard user has no inherent access to domain controller credentials or the KRBTGT hash without escalation.
C . Service account: While service accounts may have elevated privileges, they don't automatically provide the KRBTGT hash unless compromised to domain admin level-still insufficient without targeting KRBTGT specifically.
Real-World Context: The 2014 Sony Pictures hack leveraged Golden Tickets, emphasizing the need for KRBTGT hash rotation post-breach (a complex remediation step).
NEW QUESTION # 29
Which of the following statements regarding Authorization and Authentication is true?
- A. Authentication controls which processes a person can use and which files they can access, read, or modify. Authentication and authorization typically do not operate together, thus making it impossible to determine who is accessing the information.
- B. Authentication includes the execution rules that determine what functionality and data the user can access. Authentication and Authorization are both the same thing.
- C. Authorization is the process where requests to access a particular resource are granted or denied. Authentication is providing and validating the identity.
- D. Authentication is the process where requests to access a particular resource are granted or denied. Authorization is providing and validating identity.
Answer: C
Explanation:
Authentication and Authorization (often abbreviated as AuthN and AuthZ) are foundational pillars of access control in network security:
Authentication (AuthN): Verifies "who you are" by validating credentials against a trusted source. Examples include passwords, MFA (multi-factor authentication), certificates, or biometrics. It ensures the entity (user, device) is legitimate, typically via protocols like Kerberos or LDAP.
Authorization (AuthZ): Determines "what you can do" after authentication, enforcing policies on resource access (e.g., read/write permissions, API calls). It relies on mechanisms like Access Control Lists (ACLs), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), or Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC).
Option A correctly separates these roles:
Authorization governs access decisions (e.g., "Can user X read file Y?").
Authentication establishes identity (e.g., "Is this user X?").
In practice, these processes are sequential: AuthN precedes AuthZ. For example, logging into a VPN authenticates your identity (e.g., via username/password), then authorizes your access to specific subnets based on your role. CNSP likely stresses this distinction for designing secure systems, as conflating them risks privilege escalation or identity spoofing vulnerabilities.
Why other options are incorrect:
B: Reverses the definitions-Authentication doesn't grant/deny access (that's AuthZ), and Authorization doesn't validate identity (that's AuthN). This mix-up could lead to flawed security models.
C: Falsely equates AuthN and AuthZ and attributes access rules to AuthN. They're distinct processes; treating them as identical undermines granular control (e.g., NIST SP 800-53 separates IA-2 for AuthN and AC-3 for AuthZ).
D: Misassigns access control to AuthN and claims they don't interoperate, which is false-they work together in every modern system (e.g., SSO with RBAC). This would render auditing impossible, contradicting security best practices.
Real-World Context: A web server (e.g., Apache) authenticates via HTTP Basic Auth, then authorizes via .htaccess rules-two separate steps.
NEW QUESTION # 30
Which of the following is an example of a SUID program?
- A. None of the above
- B. /usr/bin/curl
- C. /usr/bin/passwd
- D. /bin/ls
Answer: C
Explanation:
In Linux/Unix, the SUID (Set User ID) bit allows a program to execute with the owner's permissions, typically root, rather than the caller's. It's denoted by an s in the user execute field (e.g., -rwsr-xr-x). Common SUID programs perform privileged tasks requiring temporary elevation.
Analysis:
C . /usr/bin/passwd:
Purpose: Updates user passwords in /etc/shadow (root-owned, 0600 perms).
Permissions: Typically -rwsr-xr-x, owned by root. The SUID bit lets non-root users modify shadow securely.
Command: ls -l /usr/bin/passwd confirms SUID (s in user execute).
A . /bin/ls:
Purpose: Lists directory contents, no privileged access needed.
Permissions: -rwxr-xr-x (no SUID). Runs as the calling user.
B . /usr/bin/curl:
Purpose: Transfers data over HTTP/FTP, no root privileges required by default.
Permissions: -rwxr-xr-x (no SUID).
Technical Details:
SUID Bit: Set via chmod u+s <file> or chmod 4755.
Security: SUID binaries are audited (e.g., find / -perm -u=s) due to escalation risks if writable or poorly coded (e.g., buffer overflows).
Security Implications: CNSP likely highlights SUID as an attack vector (e.g., CVE-1996-0095 exploited passwd flaws). Hardening removes unnecessary SUID bits.
Why other options are incorrect:
A, B: Lack SUID; no privileged operations.
D: Incorrect, as /usr/bin/passwd is a SUID example.
Real-World Context: SUID on /bin/su or /usr/bin/sudo similarly enables privilege escalation, often targeted in exploits.
NEW QUESTION # 31
Which command will perform a DNS zone transfer of the domain "victim.com" from the nameserver at 10.0.0.1?
- A. dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com axrfr
- B. dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com afxr
- C. dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com axfr
- D. dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com arfxr
Answer: C
Explanation:
A DNS zone transfer replicates an entire DNS zone (a collection of DNS records for a domain) from a primary nameserver to a secondary one, typically for redundancy or load balancing. The AXFR (Authoritative Full Zone Transfer) query type, defined in RFC 1035, facilitates this process. The dig (Domain Information Groper) tool, a staple in Linux/Unix environments, is used to query DNS servers. The correct syntax is:
dig @<nameserver> <domain> axfr
Here, dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com axfr instructs dig to request a zone transfer for "victim.com" from the nameserver at 10.0.0.1. The @ symbol specifies the target server, overriding the system's default resolver.
Technical Details:
The AXFR query is sent over TCP (port 53), not UDP, due to the potentially large size of zone data, which exceeds UDP's typical 512-byte limit (pre-EDNS0).
Successful execution requires the nameserver to permit zone transfers from the querying IP, often restricted to trusted secondaries via Access Control Lists (ACLs) for security. If restricted, the server responds with a "REFUSED" error.
Security Implications: Zone transfers expose all DNS records (e.g., A, MX, NS), making them a reconnaissance goldmine for attackers if misconfigured. CNSP likely emphasizes securing DNS servers against unauthorized AXFR requests, using tools like dig to test vulnerabilities.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com axrfr: "axrfr" is a typographical error. The correct query type is "axfr." Executing this would result in a syntax error or an unrecognized query type response from dig.
B . dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com afxr: "afxr" is another typo, not a valid DNS query type per RFC 1035. dig would fail to interpret this, likely outputting an error like "unknown query type." C . dig @10.0.0.1 victim.com arfxr: "arfxr" is also invalid, a jumbled version of "axfr." It holds no meaning in DNS protocol standards and would fail similarly.
Real-World Context: Penetration testers use dig ... axfr to identify misconfigured DNS servers. For example, dig @ns1.example.com example.com axfr might reveal subdomains or internal IPs if not locked down.
NEW QUESTION # 32
If you find the 111/TCP port open on a Unix system, what is the next logical step to take?
- A. Telnet to the port, send "GET / HTTP/1.0" and gather information from the response.
- B. Run "rpcinfo -p <hostname>" to enumerate the RPC services.
- C. Telnet to the port to look for a banner.
- D. None of the above.
Answer: B
Explanation:
Port 111/TCP is the default port for the RPC (Remote Procedure Call) portmapper service on Unix systems, which registers and manages RPC services.
Why A is correct: Running rpcinfo -p <hostname> queries the portmapper to list all registered RPC services, their programs, versions, and associated ports. This is a logical next step during a security audit or penetration test to identify potential vulnerabilities (e.g., NFS or NIS services). CNSP recommends this command for RPC enumeration.
Why other options are incorrect:
B . Telnet to the port to look for a banner: Telnet might connect, but RPC services don't typically provide a human-readable banner, making this less effective than rpcinfo.
C . Telnet to the port, send "GET / HTTP/1.0" and gather information from the response: Port 111 is not an HTTP service, so an HTTP request is irrelevant and will likely fail.
D . None of the above: Incorrect, as A is a valid and recommended step.
NEW QUESTION # 33
What ports can be queried to perform a DNS zone transfer?
- A. None of the above
- B. 53/TCP
- C. 53/UDP
- D. Both 1 and 2
Answer: B
Explanation:
A DNS zone transfer involves replicating the DNS zone data (e.g., all records for a domain) from a primary to a secondary DNS server, requiring a reliable transport mechanism.
Why A is correct: DNS zone transfers use TCP port 53 because TCP ensures reliable, ordered delivery of data, which is critical for transferring large zone files. CNSP notes that TCP is the standard protocol for zone transfers (e.g., AXFR requests), as specified in RFC 5936.
Why other options are incorrect:
B . 53/UDP: UDP port 53 is used for standard DNS queries and responses due to its speed and lower overhead, but it is not suitable for zone transfers, which require reliability over speed.
C . Both 1 and 2: This is incorrect because zone transfers are exclusively TCP-based, not UDP-based.
D . None of the above: Incorrect, as 53/TCP is the correct port for DNS zone transfers.
NEW QUESTION # 34
Which one of the following is not an online attack?
- A. Brute force attack
- B. Password spraying attack
- C. Phishing attack
- D. Rainbow table attack
Answer: D
Explanation:
Online attacks require real-time interaction with a target system (e.g., a login interface), whereas offline attacks occur without direct system interaction, typically after obtaining data like password hashes. A rainbow table attack is an offline method that uses precomputed tables of hash values to reverse-engineer passwords from stolen hash databases, distinguishing it from the other options, which are online.
Why B is correct: Rainbow table attacks are performed offline after an attacker has already acquired a hash (e.g., from a compromised database). The attacker matches the hash against precomputed tables to find the plaintext password, requiring no interaction with the target system during the attack. CNSP classifies this as an offline password recovery technique.
Why other options are incorrect:
A: Brute force attacks involve repeatedly submitting password guesses to a live system (e.g., via SSH or a web login), making it an online attack.
C: Password spraying attacks test a few common passwords across many accounts on a live system, also an online attack aimed at avoiding lockouts.
D: Phishing attacks trick users into submitting credentials through fake interfaces (e.g., emails or websites), requiring real-time interaction and thus classified as online.
NEW QUESTION # 35
Which of the following represents a valid Windows Registry key?
- A. HKEY_INTERNAL_CONFIG
- B. HKEY_LOCAL_USER
- C. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
- D. HKEY_ROOT_CLASSES
Answer: C
Explanation:
The Windows Registry is a hierarchical database storing system and application settings, organized into predefined root keys (hives). Only specific names are valid as top-level keys.
Why A is correct: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM) is a standard root key containing hardware and system-wide configuration data. CNSP references it for security settings analysis (e.g., auditing policies).
Why other options are incorrect:
B: HKEY_INTERNAL_CONFIG is not a valid key; no such hive exists.
C: HKEY_ROOT_CLASSES is a misspelling; the correct key is HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR).
D: HKEY_LOCAL_USER is incorrect; the valid key is HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU).
NEW QUESTION # 36
The Active Directory database file stores the data and schema information for the Active Directory database on domain controllers in Microsoft Windows operating systems. Which of the following file is the Active Directory database file?
- A. NTDS.MDB
- B. NTDS.DAT
- C. MSAD.MDB
- D. NTDS.DIT
Answer: D
Explanation:
The Active Directory (AD) database on Windows domain controllers contains critical directory information, stored in a specific file format.
Why D is correct: The NTDS.DIT file (NT Directory Services Directory Information Tree) is the Active Directory database file, located in C:\Windows\NTDS\ on domain controllers. It stores all AD objects (users, groups, computers) and schema data in a hierarchical structure. CNSP identifies NTDS.DIT as the key file for AD data extraction in security audits.
Why other options are incorrect:
A . NTDS.DAT: Not a valid AD database file; may be a confusion with other system files.
B . NTDS.MDB: Refers to an older Microsoft Access database format, not used for AD.
C . MSAD.MDB: Not a recognized file for AD; likely a misnomer.
NEW QUESTION # 37
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